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In dynamic cross-enterprise collaborations, different enterprises form a − possibly tempo-
rary − business relationship. To integrate their business processes, enterprises may need to
grant each other limited access to their information systems. Authentication and authoriza-
tion are key to secure information handling. However, access control policies often rely on
non-standardized attributes to describe the roles and permissions of their employees which
convolutes cross-organizational authorization when business relationships evolve quickly.
Our framework addresses the managerial overhead of continuous updates to access con-
trol policies for enterprise information systems to accommodate disparate attribute usage.
By inferring attribute relationships, our framework facilitates attribute and policy reconcili-
ation, and automatically aligns dynamic entitlements during the evaluation of authorization
decisions. We validate our framework with a Industry 4.0 motivating scenario on networked
production where such dynamic cross-enterprise collaborations are quintessential. The evalu-
ation reveals the capabilities and performance of our framework, and illustrates the feasibility
of liberating the security administrator from manually provisioning and aligning attributes,
and verifying the consistency of access control policies for cross-enterprise collaborations.
Keywords: security; policy-based access control; dynamic cross-enterprise collaboration;
authorization; enterprise computing tools
1. Introduction
Enterprises are turning to attribute-based access control (ABAC) policies to enforce au-
thorization to their information systems and business applications because ABAC policies
give them the flexibility they need to express authorization rights and entitlements with
a finer granularity of access control. The reason is twofold: (1) attributes can describe any
property of an entity (e.g. the user, information asset, context) that must be considered
for authorization purposes, and (2) a policy-based access control approach defines and
evaluates security rules separate from the core business logic, which makes such security
policies easier to adapt to changing access control demands.
Nowadays, state-of-practice identity and access management (IAM) systems already
externalize authentication (i.e. ascertaining that somebody really is who he claims to be)
and authorization (i.e. security rules that determine who is allowed to do what) from the
main application. An IAM system relies on an identity provider (IdP) to describe subjects
with different (types of) attributes (e.g. the profile, roles and credentials of a user within
the organization). This way, security administrators can eliminate the need to maintain
separate user credentials and access control policies for different services, hereby greatly
simplifying the identity life cycle management of the users and their permissions within
the trust boundaries of the enterprise.
For enterprise collaborations across these trust boundaries, the security administrator
can add the IdP of a collaborating business partner to the circle of trust of its own IAM
1
Page 1 of 26
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/teis  Email: eis@odu.edu
Enterprise Information Systems
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
December 21, 2016 Enterprise Information Systems paper
Figures are not embedded in the manuscript (cfr. instructions for authors).
Figure 1. Figure captions are saved separately, and listed at the end of the manuscript.
system, enabling federated single sign-on (SSO) to facilitate cross-enterprise authentica-
tion through delegation. However, cross-enterprise authorization remains a non-trivial
challenge, as different enterprises may grant limited access to each other’s business ap-
plications and data (see Figure 1) but use different attributes and impose other security
rules regarding the subject requesting access, the actual resource to be accessed, and the
nature of the temporary business partnership. By not having a centralized authority in
place that standardizes all identity and attribute definitions, Enterprise 1 may rely on
possibly missing or inconsistent attributes of the IdP of Enterprise 2 to evaluate and
enforce its own access control policies.
1.1. Problem statement
The first challenge that we address in this work is that in dynamic cross-enterprise
business ecosystems, there is no common definition for the attributes in the IdP of one
enterprise and those used in the access control policies of the other enterprise. There are
solutions to map attribute types from one backend system to another, but they target
batch reconciliation of mainly static attributes across IdPs and databases within a single
enterprise. However, authorization across enterprise boundaries that reacts immediately
to dynamic business relationships requires disparate attribute types and values to be
reconciled during the evaluation of the access control decision rather than in batch mode.
The second challenge that we address targets the recent trend of IAM moving towards
identity relationship management (IRM) (Andresen (2014)). Whereas IAM systems were
traditionally built for access control by on-premise employees, does IRM target manag-
ing trust relationships with parties inside and outside of the enterprise, including those
of customers, devices and other things across intertwined networks. This adds to the
managerial overhead for the security administrator in charge of access control for the
enterprise information systems. Not only will the diversity of user and device attributes
continue to proliferate, the inherent dynamic, transient and implicit identity relationships
will further aggravate the complexity of freeing enterprises from manually establishing
collaborations with one another and security administrators having to continuously up-
date their authorization policies.
1.2. Contribution
To address these challenges, our access control framework provides the following key
contributions for enterprise information systems:
(1) Facilitating policy reconciliation through inference of transient and implicit identity
and attribute relationships during the evaluation of access control decisions
(2) Simplified administration of cross-organizational dynamic entitlements and identity
relationship management
(3) A practical implementation on top of a state-of-practice IAM system with an ac-
ceptable performance overhead
We validate the framework in an Industry 4.0 use case where temporary cross-enterprise
collaborations for manufacturing and logistics are quintessential. The scenario exhibits
networked production across production factories where a customer’s personal prefer-
ences can be swiftly fulfilled without any delay on the production process.
After discussing related work in section 2, we present a motivating use case on net-
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worked production and concerted manufacturing processes in section 3. We propose in
section 4 our framework for reconciling attributes and policies for identity access and
relationship management. In section 5, we aim at mapping these concepts onto a prac-
tical implementation on top of a state-of-practice IAM system. We discuss performance
aspects in section 6. We conclude in section 7 summarizing our main insights.
2. Related work
In this section, we briefly review the state-of-the-art in the area of policy-based access
control, discuss cyber-security challenges in Industry 4.0 collaboration scenarios, identify
what is missing and highlight how we aim to bridge this gap.
2.1. Policy-based access control
Access control is a key information protection mechanism, with the most common, old-
est, and most well-known identity-based access control models being Discretionary Ac-
cess Control (DAC), Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and Role Based Access Control
(RBAC) (Sandhu (1993); Sandhu and Samarati (1994); Sandhu et al. (1996)). Recently,
there has been growing interest in Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) (Jin, Kr-
ishnan, and Sandhu (2012)) to overcome the limitations of the aforementioned access
control models. The ABAC model makes decisions on permitting or denying access by
relying on attributes of subj cts, resources, actions, and the environment. It allows for
resource owners, such as enterprise information systems, to grant access to unanticipated
users as long as they have attributes that meet certain criteria. In policy-based access
control, such as Ponder (Damianou et al. (2001)), Rei and KAoS (Tonti et al. (2003)),
and the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) specification (XACML-
V3.0 (2012)), regulation of access to protected resources is expressed external to the
applications as high-level rules that define who has access to what resources under what
conditions. In Ferraiolo et al. (2016), the authors offer a comparison of the XACML and
NGAC attribute-based access control specifications and underlying architectures. The
latest trend in access control models is Risk-Adaptive Access Control (RAdAC) (Kan-
dala, Sandhu, and Bhamidipati (2011); Ni, Bertino, and Lobo (2010)) where access de-
cisions depend on dynamic risk assessments.
2.2. Cyber-security in Industry 4.0
A detailed discussion on the definition of Industry 4.0 (Lee, Bagheri, and Kao (2015))
is beyond the scope of this work. Instead, we refer to a quantitative text analysis and a
qualitative literature review carried out by Herman et al. (Hermann, Pentek, and Otto
(2016)), in which they identify the main design principles of Industry 4.0. They also
present a case study to illustrate how these design principles can support practitioners in
identifying Industry 4.0 scenarios. In Lee, Bagheri, and Kao (2015), the authors discuss
the systematical deployment of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), and propose a unified
5C-level architecture (based on connection, conversion, cyber, cognition and configure) as
a guideline for the implementation of CPS in the manufacturing industry. More recently,
Wang et al. (2016) highlighted the need for horizontal integration of inter-corporation
value networks, the end-to-end integration of engineering value chain, and the vertical
integration of factory inside. They discuss the importance of emerging technologies such
as IoT, big data and cloud computing in Industry 4.0.
Cyber-security remains a clear challenge for the rollout of the smart factories of the
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Figure 2. Figure captions are saved separately, and listed at the end of the manuscript.
future. Many of the systems, technologies and protocols that exist today and that will
become constituents of Industry 4.0 were never designed with networked production and
large scale connectivity in mind. This can be witnessed from recent successful attacks on
SCADA systems by dangerous malware like Stuxnet, Duqu, Flame, and Gauss (Langner
(2011); Bencsa´th et al. (2012)). Nicholson et al. (2012) survey ongoing research and
present an overview of risks, threats and mitigation strategies in the area of SCADA
security.
2.3. Bridging the dynamic cross-enterprise collaboration security gap
Networked and individualized mass production will communicate considerably more in-
formation about the manufacturing process itself across the network. A major threat are
attackers involved in industrial espionage that steal and sell this information to competi-
tors to produce counterfeit products. With unauthorized access to sensitive information
becoming a key concern, identity and access management in the Internet of Things (IoT)
will be critical in an overarching defense-in-depth strategy to the success of Industry 4.0.
In a book (Mahalle and Railkar (2015)) and recent Gartner report (Perkins and Allan
(2015)) on the same topic, the challenges of identity management and the identity of
things in IoT are highlighted. As machines, products and services will be more abundant
than users, the industrial IoT requires managing exponentially more identities and rela-
tionships between entities than contemporary Identity and Access Management (IAM)
systems had to support up until today.
Our framework goes beyond the state-of-the-art by addressing authorization for enter-
prise information systems with a solution that specifically focuses on the enforcement of
access control policies for dynamic cross-enterprise collaborations. To address the afore-
mentioned challenges, our framework bridges this gap by automatically aligning disparate
attribute usage across enterprise information and security systems.
3. Industry 4.0 motivating use case
A digital transformation is taking place in the manufacturing world, often referred to as
the 4th Generation Industrial Revolution (Industry 4.0) (Lee, Bagheri, and Kao (2015))
or the Factory of the Future (FoF) (Karnouskos et al. (2012)). These paradigm shifts
envision smart factories where the Internet of Things (IoT) and Cyber-Physical Systems
(CPS)-enabled manufacturing will provide the foundations for creating smart products
through smart processes and procedures. Smart products will plan, control and optimize
their own production process with minimal human intervention. The digital transforma-
tion with business applications moving to the cloud will enhance the transparency of
the production process, even across the organizational boundaries of the manufacturing
enterprise (see Figure 2).
Digital identities and relationships already play a major role in manufacturing and
logistics to track and trace (Keme´ny, Ilie-Zudor, and Monostori (2009)) the current
and past locations of products and the relationships with the customer. However, the
paradigm shift also harbors severe cyber-security risks and threats (Nicholson et al.
(2012)), ranging from viruses and malware (Langner (2011); Bencsa´th et al. (2012)) that
sabotage critical infrastructure, to unauthorized access to sensitive customer data and
industrial espionage from within. Especially in production networks that operate across
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the organizational trust boundaries of the enterprise, the number of potential targets
for attack increases. With unauthorized access to sensitive information being a major
concern in this rapidly evolving and competitive business, adequate verification of dig-
ital identities, access privileges and relationships across the trust boundaries of several
partnering enterprises is paramount. The key challenges that the stakeholders in such
non-centralized cross-organizational collaboration scenarios are often faced with, include:
(1) There is an exponential growth of identities for employees, business partners, con-
sumers and machines, adding to the managerial overhead.
(2) Production transparency needs in-network access control rather than just at the
edge of the network.
(3) Cross-organizational authorization policies use inconsistent attributes for identities
and relationships.
The first two challenges can be addressed with scalable identity management solutions
that − specifically for networked production − enable integration with legacy manu-
facturing systems. This work focuses on the last challenge to ensure that dynamic en-
titlements are enforced correctly by all collaborating partners even without an upfront
agreement on their definition and relationship with other attributes. There is a huge
demand for such solutions, as due to the dynamic nature of business relationships, com-
panies at one stage can collaborate as business partners only to act as competitors for
future production orders.
4. Reconciling attributes and relationships
This section discusses relevant concepts in identity relationship management, key con-
cerns with dynamic entitlements in cross-organizational policy-based access control, and
limitations in the state-of-practice to effectively address these challenging concerns.
4.1. Identities, attributes and relationships
Identity management systems are based on the concept of a digital identity, which can
represent an individual, a device or any other type of entity. These identities are an-
notated with attributes that are instantiated according to a data schema of an LDAP
server or an entity relationship model of an underlying SQL database.
The identities and their attributes are used in a security model or policy to evaluate
access control decisions. Role-based access control (RBAC) (Sandhu et al. (1996)) is one
of the most widely adopted security models in many enterprises. Figure 3 illustrates
the metamodel of RBAC where (1) users are granted roles, (2) permissions are assigned
to roles, (3) permissions are expressed as combinations of operations on objects, and
(4) users acquire permissions by activating a role in an application session. Most RBAC
implementations also enable the definition of role hierarchies (i.e. a partial order between
roles) to model the inheritance of permissions, and constraints for enforcing separation
of duties (SOD) to spread the responsibility of a sensitive task over multiple individuals.
A key challenge with networked production where manufacturing is driven by Cyber-
Physical Systems is the explosion of roles. These systems are objects with their own
identity, and access control supervises the execution of operations on other objects. With
an IRM roadmap that unifies the identity of objects and users, objects will be assigned
5
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roles too to infer their permission set. Furthermore, enforcing dynamic separation of
duties for cross-organizational tasks means a further duplication of certain roles.
The role explosion is the main reason why enterprises have recognized there is a need
to go beyond groups of permissions and roles to manage access control to their shared
resources. Attribute-based access control (ABAC) (Yuan and Tong (2005); Coyne and
Weil (2013)) is a model where requests of a user (a.k.a. subject) to perform opera-
tions on an object (a.k.a. resource) are granted or denied based on rules. These rules
express conditions on attributes assigned to the user and the object in question. The
XACML (XACML-V3.0 (2012)) specification offers a standardized language for express-
ing such access control policies. The simplicity of ABAC lies in that attribute-based
decisions are more flexible compared to RBAC’s rigid structure of roles and permissions.
Another advantage of ABAC is that it can accommodate more easily the use of dynamic
environmental attributes in access control decisions, such as the time of day and location
of a user or object. However, a disadvantage is that a large number of attributes has to
be managed and maintained by security administrators as the meaning of an attribute
is only substantiated when associated with a user and object in the frame of an access
policy rule.
RBAC and ABAC can coexist by considering a role as another attribute of a user,
though associating a role with a collection of permissions is not trivial. As such, auditing
is more straightforward with RBAC as roles with permissions define what objects a user
is allowed to access, whereas auditing with ABAC to understand a user’s permission
set requires an exhaustive enumeration of all the attributes of the user and those of all
objects, as well as an evaluation of all access policy rules.
A key observation for role-centric and attribute-centric access control is that the do-
main knowledge or semantic meaning of attributes and relationships is directly encoded
either in the database schema (RBAC) or in the policy rules that govern the access
control decisions (ABAC). This is a challenge for cross-organizational collaboration sce-
narios where interoperability is key. The lack of common pre-existing schemas defining
and externalizing all identity and attribute relationships upfront, is the main reason why
federated authorization suffers from misalignments at different levels:
• Attribute: Missing, inconsistent naming or different semantic meaning of identity
attribute types and values
• Relationship: Different role-permission assignments or mismatching partial orders
in the role hierarchy
Such misalignments for users and objects will be harder to resolve in a world of the
Internet of Things where identity relationships will be much more transient and implicit.
4.2. Reconciliation of cross-organizational attributes and identity
relationships
To address the aforementioned concerns and challenges, we present a framework to ex-
ternalize domain knowledge in order to dynamically reconcile attributes and identity
relationships. This framework eliminates the need for common standardized attributes,
hereby simplifying interoperability between business partners. The framework facilitates
policy-based access control across organizations and the administration of dynamic en-
titlements through inference of transient and implicit attribute relationships.
6
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4.2.1. Partial ordered sets of users and objects
As identity relationship management is scaling out to support identities for both users
and objects that interact with one another (possibly on behalf of their owner), we must
revise the level of abstraction of users and objects to establish the kind of roles and
relationships they have with one another and how that affects access control decisions.
The first construct we support in our framework is the definition of partial ordered
sets U and O, respectively for sets of users ui and sets of objects oi:
u1, u2, u3, ... ∈ U o1, o2, o3, ... ∈ O (1)
where each element ui of the partial ordered set U represents a (labeled) set of users,
and each element oi represents a (labeled) set of objects. We define the binary relation ≤
between elements as a subset of, such that U is a partially ordered set if for each element
ui ∈ U the following holds:
ui ≤ ui (reflexivity) (2)
ui ≤ uj ∧ uj ≤ uk ⇒ ui ≤ uk (transitivity) (3)
ui ≤ uj ∧ uj ≤ ui ⇒ ui = uj (anti-symmetry) (4)
A set of users ui can be defined in terms of its individual constituents, as well as in terms
of other user sets uj , as illustrated below:
u1 = {bob, alice}
u2 = {u1, eve}
u3 = {alice, bob,mallory}
For the above example, we can infer that u1 ≤ u2 and u1 ≤ u3. However, as there is
no subset relationship between u2 and u3, we say that the pair of elements u2 and u3 is
incomparable. Similar definitions and properties also hold for the partial ordered set O
of object sets oi.
The notion of partial ordered sets plays a vital role to infer inheritance and permission
relationships across different sets of users and objects. Later on, we will illustrate how
these partial ordered sets are used for reconciling identities based on their attributes.
4.2.2. Equivalence of attribute types and values
Users and objects are annotated with attributes of a particular type, each having a
certain value. Consider an enterprise with an identity management system holding the
following sets of LDAP attributes for a user bob:
bob.userName = ’bob’
bob.givenName = ’Bob’
bob.sn = ’Builder’
bob.mail = ’bob@enterprise1.com’
bob.postalAddress = ’221B Baker Street’
bob.city = ’London’
bob.postalCode = ’NW1 6XE’
bob.country = ’UK’
bob.role = ’worker’
To align this attribute set with those of an identity management system of another
7
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organization, our framework is able to align both attribute types and values by declara-
tively defining equivalence relationships. This is illustrated in the examples below:
(1) Equivalent attribute types:
givenName ≡ firstName
sn ≡ surName ≡ lastName ≡ familyName
postalCode ≡ zipCode
(2) Equivalent attribute values:
’UK’ ≡ ’United Kingdom’
’worker’ ≡ ’labourer’
The definition of equivalence relationships simplifies federated authorization in cross-
organizational collaborations between business partners where the identity provider of
Enterprise 2 provides attributes that need to be aligned with those used in the access
control policies of Enterprise 1, and vice versa (as depicted in Figure 1).
4.2.3. Implicit definition of user and object sets
The attributes types and values can also be used to define implicit user and object sets by
constraining a particular attribute value, rather than explicitly enumerating all relevant
users and objects. For example, our framework can declare the set of workers as a new
user set as follows:
workers ≡ ( ?.role = ’worker’ )
This user set may initially represent a certain group of individuals, including the user
bob. However, if other employees would later be added with a role labourer, then due the
semantic equivalence of the role attribute, the implicit user set workers would automat-
ically include these users for the computation of any access control decision. As a result,
user sets as well as object sets can be defined through explicit membership assignments
as well as through implicit attribute associations.
To express security concerns like dynamic separation of duty, we rely on the above
construct to infer that two user sets with conflicting roles are disjoint.
developers ≡ ( ?.role = ’developer’ )
testers ≡ ( ?.role = ’tester’ )
developers ∩ testers ≡ ∅
The above example is a typical Chinese wall policy which states that individuals devel-
oping and testing software features should belong to different teams in order to avoid any
conflict of interest. The implicit definition of user sets is used to assert that an individual
should never activate both roles at the same time.
4.2.4. Permissions as user-action-object triples
Compared to ABAC specification languages like XACML that use conditions to find
relevant policies and rules to evaluate access control decisions, our framework expresses
permissions by means of associations between users, objects and actions. The following
8
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example illustrates the definition of a permission as a triple:
u1 = {bob, alice} (user set)
a1 = {read, write} (action set)
o1 = {doc1, doc2} (object set)
p1 =< u1, a1, o1 > (permission)
The advantage of this approach is that relevant permission definitions for users or objects
can be easily retrieved by object references. The framework can further generalize the
definition of permissions pi to a set of objects oj (rather than a set of users uj) executing
a set of actions ak on another object set ol, i.e. pi =< oj , ak, ol >.
4.2.5. Policies as partial ordered sets
Our framework defines a policy as a set of permission triples si, such that an action
is granted if there is at least one permission pj ∈ si in the set that matches with the
request:
si = {p1, p2, ...} (permission set)
s1, s2, ... ∈ S (partial ordered set)
Policies enable the logical grouping of permissions, and the security administrator decides
which permission set si must be activated. When multiple permission sets si, sj , ... are
activated for a particular object, then all these permission sets must grant the requested
action for that particular user. Otherwise the action is denied.
Rather than overriding permissions with combination algorithms, our framework relies
on the definition of permission sets as partial ordered sets to avoid sophisticated conflict
resolution schemes:
s0 = {p1, p2}
s1 = {p3, p4, p5}
s2 = {s0, s1}
By activating the permission sets s0 and s1, our framework evaluates the following access
control decision:
s0 ∧ s1 = (p1 ∨ p2) ∧ (p3 ∨ p4 ∨ p5)
whereas by activating s2 it evaluates:
s3 = s0 ∨ s1 = (p1 ∨ p2 ∨ p3 ∨ p4 ∨ p5)
Denying access or prohibiting the execution of certain operations can then be achieved
by declaring an empty action set ai for a combination of users uj and objects ok.
ai = {}
uj = {mallory, eve}
ok = {x files, trade secrets}
pl =< uj , ai, ok >
9
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This way the security administrator has the ability to logically compose permission sets
as partial ordered sets with a clear definition on how the combination of policies can
affect the outcome of an access control decision.
4.2.6. Dynamic entitlements
In our framework, dynamic entitlements are fine-grained access entitlements or privileges
that are administered depending on the situation at hand (e.g. a continuously evolving
temporary business relationship). These are particularly useful for networked production
where the action permission is restricted by the location of the user or the manufacturing
system within the production facility. By grounding users and machines to a particular
location (v. Cleeff, Pieters, andWieringa (2010)), attackers have more difficulty in gaining
unauthorized access to sensitive information.
on premise ≡ ( ?.location = ’enterprise1’ )
As such, dynamic entitlements are achieved through constraints on dynamic (environ-
mental) attributes for users and objects, in a similar way as elaborated in the previous
subsection on the implicit definition of user and object sets. The only distinction is that
these attributes are provisioned externally, and not by any identity management system.
4.2.7. Administrative privileges
By design, our framework also supports dynamic provisioning and customization of the
user and object sets by means of declaring administrative privileges that are enforced by
the access control framework itself.
managers ≡ ( ?.role = ’manager’ )
a1 = { add, remove }
u1 = { bob, alice }
p1 = < managers, a1, u1 >
This example states that managers have administrative privileges to add or remove en-
tities to the given set of users. Compared to the XACML reference architecture where
policy administration is a dedicated component (i.e. the Policy Administration Point),
is policy administration directly integrated into and enforced by our framework.
5. Practical implementation
In this section, we present the practical implementation of our reconciliation framework
for identity access and relationship management. We discuss details about the technical
realization for cross-organizational manufacturing processes in which the authenticity of
identity for users, machines and processes in networked production is verified.
Each production facility deploys its own identity management system, including their
own data schema to store user and object attributes. Our framework builds on top of
ForgeRock’s OpenIDM framework (see Figure 4), a role provisioning and entitlement
management platform part of ForgeRock’s Open Identity Stack for high available and
large-scale, mission-critical deployments1 including the Internet of Things.
1https://www.forgerock.com/resources/high-availability-internet-things/
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5.1. Identity provisioning for users and objects
Our proof-of-concept framework integrates with OpenIDM and its CRUDPAQ-based
REST interfaces to provision and retrieve managed objects, such as users and devices.
In practice, all entities (user, devices and services) involved in networked production can
initiate such requests. Provisioning a new user as a JSON object is done with an HTTP
POST request using the administrator’s credentials of OpenIDM, as shown with the curl
command-line utility in Listing 1:
1 admin@work :~$ curl \
2 --header "Content -Type: application/json" \
3 --header "X-OpenIDM -Username: openidm -admin" \
4 --header "X-OpenIDM -Password: openidm -admin" \
5 --request POST \
6 --data ’{
7 "userName ":" bob",
8 "givenName ":" Bob",
9 "sn":" Builder",
10 "mail ":" bob@enterprise1.com",
11 "postalAddress ":"221B Baker Street",
12 "city ":" London",
13 "postalCode ":" NW1 6XE",
14 "country ":"UK",
15 "role ":[" worker"],
16 "password ":" MyS3cret!",
17 "description ":"A senior employee with enterprise 1",
18 "_id":" bob" }’ \
19 https :// host/openidm/managed/user/? _action=create
Listing 1 Creating a new user in OpenIDM
To create such a user, the OpenIDM administrator must first configure a data schema
that defines the type and validation patterns for all the attributes. To retrieve all the
users, one can issue an HTTP GET with the following curl command:
1 admin@work :~$ curl \
2 --header "X-OpenIDM -Username: openidm -admin" \
3 --header "X-OpenIDM -Password: openidm -admin" \
4 --request GET \
5 https :// host/openidm/managed/us r/? _queryId=query -all -ids
6
7 {"result":[{"_id":"bob","_rev":"1"}],"resultCount":1,
8 "pagedResultsCookie":null ,"totalPagedResultsPolicy":"NONE",
9 "totalPagedResults":-1,"remainingPagedResults":-1}
Listing 2 Retrieving all users from OpenIDM
One can query the details of a particular user with a REST request like this:
1 admin@work :~$ curl \
2 --header "X-OpenIDM -Username: openidm -admin" \
3 --header "X-OpenIDM -Password: openidm -admin" \
4 --request GET \
5 https :// host/openidm/managed/user/bob?_prettyPrint=true
6
7 {
8 "_id" : "bob",
9 "_rev" : "1",
10 "userName" : "bob",
11 "givenName" : "Bob",
12 "sn" : "Builder",
13 "mail" : "bob@enterprise1.com",
14 "postalAddress" : "221B Baker Street",
15 "city" : "London",
16 "postalCode" : "NW1 6XE",
17 "country" : "UK",
18 "role": ["worker"],
19 "description" : "A senior employee with enterprise 1",
20 "accountStatus" : "active",
21 "effectiveRoles" : [ ],
22 "effectiveAssignments" : [ ]
23 }
Listing 3 Retrieving user ’bob’ from OpenIDM
The above examples merely demonstrate standard functionality and capabilities offered
out-of-the-box by ForgeRock’s OpenIDM platform.
11
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5.2. Provisioning user and device to manufacturing facility relationships
Within Industry 4.0 supported by Cyber-Physical Production Systems, there will be
long-standing relationships between many types of devices (machinery, sensors and actu-
ators) and the manufacturing facility. We register these devices (including any globally
unique identifiers, shared secrets, certificates and PKI details) through the dashboard of
OpenIDM (as depicted in Figure 4) as a new type of managed objects.
For each type of managed object (e.g. user, device, service, facility), we declare a
schema with various properties and validation patterns regarding the content of these
properties, as well as many-to-many relationships to other managed objects. This way,
we can establish trust relationships when a new device − such as a sensor, actuator, or
other machinery − joins or leaves the facility. Similarly, we can model which user and
services have a relationship with a device. Note that this is not to enforce access control,
but rather to establish which security material is needed for authentication and secure
communication between these managed objects.
1 admin@work :~$ curl \
2 --header "X-OpenIDM -Username: openidm -admin" \
3 --header "X-OpenIDM -Password: openidm -admin" \
4 --request GET \
5 https :// host/openidm/managed/device /? _queryId=query -all -ids
Listing 4 Retrieving all devices from OpenIDM
Last but not least, each of these managed objects can be queried using REST requests
(see Listing 4) in a similar way as in Listing 2 and 3.
5.3. Identities for legacy production systems
The whole identity and access management suite for networked production is built on
top of ForgeRock’s Open Identity Stack that makes use of the following components:
• OpenIDM: identity provisioning
• OpenAM: authentication and federated single sign on
• OpenDJ: high performance and secure directory server
• OpenIG: identity gateway acting as a reverse proxy
OpenAM uses OpenDJ as an identity repository and the latter is provisioned through
OpenIDM. All the authentication requests to and responses from OpenAM may pass
through OpenIG (as depicted in Figure 5). OpenIG is not a mandatory component but
it simplifies secure access to remote cloud services for legacy production systems and ap-
plications without having to modify them to support state-of-practice authentication and
authorization protocols such as OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect and SAML 2.0. For large
scale deployments with many IoT or CPS devices, we use HAProxy2, a high performance
TCP/HTTP load-balancing proxy server.
5.4. Reconciling attributes and relationships
The strength of our framework lies in the externalization of relationships between at-
tributes and identities into a domain knowledge model that can be separately managed
and maintained by each organization, and adapted by the security administrators towards
2http://www.haproxy.org
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the attribute definitions used by their identity management systems. To automatically
infer implicit relationships, our access control framework leverages the OWL 2 RL3 ontol-
ogy language (Grau et al. (2008); Kro¨tzsch (2012)) to formally and semantically represent
user and object sets, as well as equivalence, inheritance, transitive, reflexive and sym-
metric relationships for any of the attributes with those attributes used by the other
party.
Defining implicit user or object sets based on attribute restrictions (and not by enumer-
ating its constituents) is fairly straightforward, as illustrated for the implicit detectives
user set in Listing 5 (using the OWL Manchester syntax).
1 /* Semantic reconciliation of attributes and identity relationships */
2
3 <http :// host/ontologies /2016/5/ abac > rdf:type owl:Ontology .
4
5 :familyName rdf:type owl:DatatypeProperty ;
6 owl:equivalentProperty :sn .
7
8 :firstName rdf:type owl:DatatypeProperty ;
9 owl:equivalentProperty :givenName .
10
11 :givenName rdf:type owl:DatatypeProperty .
12
13 :lastName rdf:type owl:DatatypeProperty ;
14 owl:equivalentProperty :sn .
15
16 :postalCode rdf:type owl:DatatypeProperty ;
17 owl:equivalentProperty :zipCode .
18
19 :role rdf:type owl:DatatypeProperty ;
20 rdfs:domain :UserSet .
21
22 :sn rdf:type owl:DatatypeProperty ;
23 owl:equivalentProperty :surName .
24
25 :surName rdf:type owl:DatatypeProperty .
26
27 :zipCode rdf:type owl:DatatypeProperty .
28
29 :location rdf:type owl:DatatypeProperty .
30
31 :Permission rdf:type owl:Class .
32
33 :Set rdf:type owl:Class .
34
35 :UserSet rdf:type owl:Class ;
36 rdfs:subClassOf :Set .
37
38 :ObjectSet rdf:type owl:Class ;
39 rdfs:subClassOf :Set .
40
41 :Workers rdf:type owl:Class ;
42 rdfs:subClassOf :UserSet ,
43 [ rdf:type owl:Restriction ;
44 owl:onProperty :role ;
45 owl:someValuesFrom [ rdf:type rdfs:Datatype ;
46 owl:oneOf [ rdf:type rdf:List ;
47 rdf:first "worker" ;
48 rdf:rest rdf:nil
49 ]
50 ]
51 ] .
Listing 5 Reconciling attributes and relationships
The datatype properties in the above example (such as sn, givenName, surName, ...) cor-
respond with the attribute definitions of the OpenIDM platform with which our frame-
work integrates. OpenIDM saves the attribute declarations for that particular configura-
tion in a JSON file (usually in the <openidm>/conf/managed.json file). Our framework
imports this configuration file and translates all attribute definitions into equivalent ones
in the above ontology specification language such that reconciliation mappings can be
edited with a tool like Prote´ge´ (see Figure 6).
The inference engine loads the OWL domain knowledge model with the reconciliation
3http://www.w3.org/TR/owl2-profiles/#OWL_2_RL
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mappings, and leverages the Drools 6.5 rule engine4 from JBoss to implement the OWL 2
RL ontology profile and semantic reasoning backend. Declarative rules are used to trigger
environmental attribute updates for users and objects (e.g. location).
6. Evaluation
This section offers qualitative and quantitative evaluation of our attribute-based access
control framework.
6.1. Qualitative comparison with XACML
A key advantage of our framework is that it separates the domain knowledge from the
rule-based policies of XACML, which makes the reconciliation of attributes and relation-
ships in cross-organizational authorization policies much easier. Subsets of users and/or
objects that are otherwise part of the access rule definition are now declared separately,
simplifying the definition of a policy towards a logical composition of permission triples.
This is a key benefit compared to XACML-based ABAC policies for which it is not trivial
to ascertain which policies apply for a given access request. The XACML specification
incorporates dedicated language constructs (i.e. targets) to identify which policies and
rules are relevant to compute an access control decision.
With XACML, the decision of multiple relevant policies may conflict with one another,
and special rule and policy combination algorithms must be used by the security admin-
istrator to define which access control decision overrides the others. This makes conflict
resolution with XACML-based access control policies unnecessary complicated compared
to the logical composition of permissions in our framework.
6.2. Performance and scalability evaluation
In this subsection, we carry out a systematic scalability assessment using the Universal
Scalability Law (USL) (Gunther (2007)) demonstrating the performance and scalability
of our framework. The USL combines (a) the initial linear scalability of a system under
increasing load, (b) the cost of sharing resources, (c) the diminishing returns due to
contention, and (d) the negative returns from incoherency into a model that defines the
relative capacity C(N):
C(N) =
N
1 + α(N − 1) + βN(N − 1)
(5)
where N represents the scalability of the software system in terms of the number of
concurrent access control requests, α represents the contention penalty, and β defines the
coherency penalty, with 0 ≤ α, β < 1. To benchmark the scalability, N is incremented
on a fixed configuration.
In our experimental setup, we deployed OpenIDM and our framework on a Dell Pow-
erEdge R620 server with 32 Intel Xeon E5-2650 CPU cores running at 2.00GHz, and
4http://www.drools.org
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64GB of memory connected to a 1 Gigabit network. This server evaluated access control
decisions against a set of 100 artificial permission definitions based on random subsets
from collections of 1000 users, 1000 objects and 10 actions. The access control policies
used user and object attributes that required reconciliation against the attributes sent
by the client, as outlined in section 3.2.2.
We simulated an increasing number of concurrent access requests from users, devices,
services, etc. against the REST interfaces of our framework with a mix of read/write
operations. The read operations represent access requests without any update in the
user attributes. The write operations represent access requests where a user attribute was
changed such that the implicit user sets and other relationships require reconciliation,
hereby triggering the reasoning engine in our framework to infer any relevant attribute
and identity relationships.
Figures 7 and 8 show the scalability of the system with a growing number of con-
current entities that each submit access requests to the server hosting our framework
at a rate of 1 per second, with respectively a 95/5 and 50/50 read-write ratio. For the
first deployment and configuration, we reach near linear scalability up to about 6000
requests per second, whereas for the second configuration we start to deviate from linear
scalability at around 1600 requests per second. The performance drop can be explained
by the fact that attribute updates by the client trigger the reasoning engine to reconcile
the attributes again. Nonetheless, this experiment validates the technical feasibility for
deploying our solution, especially when one considers that write requests are less likely
compared to read requests, and that our solution can be scaled out horizontally through
sharding on the object identifiers for which access is requested.
We also carried out a preliminary performance comparison with a XACML3-based
policy engine5. We noticed a 30% performance improvement for our framework in bench-
mark scenarios with large and complex policy rules. While we could not generalize the
performance gain overall, we believe that this positive effect was due to the fact that
the XACML3 engine had to re-evaluate with each access requests which policies were
applicable (i.e. the target clause) and the complete evaluation of the rules as well. By
externalizing the domain knowledge and defining implicit user and object sets, much of
the equivalent computations in our framework may have been cached across different
access requests. A more in-depth performance analysis and comparison is required to
validate these observations.
7. Conclusion
Linking production facilities to the Internet and connecting them to the cloud for remote
monitoring and data analysis opens them up to severe security threats, ranging from sab-
otaging critical infrastructure from the outside, to unauthorized access to sensitive cus-
tomer data and industrial espionage from within. Especially in production networks that
operate across the organizational boundaries of the enterprise, the number of potential
targets for attack increases.
5https://github.com/wso2/balana
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We presented an attribute-based access control proof-of-concept framework that sup-
ports policy reconciliation in authorization scenarios that cross the organizational trust
boundaries of the enterprise. Our framework targets applications where different col-
laborating enterprises grant each other limited access to shared business services and
data depending on the contextual circumstances. The main challenge that we address
is the managerial overhead for security architects when non-standardized attributes are
used across identity management systems and attribute-based access control policies that
convolute cross-organizational authorization. Our solution facilitates attribute and pol-
icy reconciliation during the evaluation of access control decisions. By inferring attribute
relationships, our framework aligns dynamic entitlements and identity relationship man-
agement to accommodate disparate attribute usage across enterprise security systems.
The prototype operates on top of a state-of-practice identity and access management
platform, and is validated for a motivating scenario on networked production where such
cross-organizational collaborations are quintessential. By systematically benchmarking
our framework against the Universal Scalability Law, we were able to demonstrate the
practical performance of our solution.
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Figure captions
Following the instructions for the authors for this journal (http://www.tandfonline.
com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=teis20&page=instructions), we in-
clude below the figure captions as a list.
• Figure 1: Identities and relationships in dynamic cross-enterprise collaborations
• Figure 2: Trust boundaries for cross-organizational networked production in Indus-
try 4.0
• Figure 3: Role-based access control metamodel
• Figure 4: Registering devices as managed objects
• Figure 5: Identity management and access control with legacy production systems
• Figure 6: Attribute reconciliations in Prote´ge´
• Figure 7: Systematic scalability analysis for a read-heavy workload (95% read - 5%
write)
• Figure 8: Systematic scalability analysis for a write-heavy workload (50% read -
50% write)
18
Page 18 of 26
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/teis  Email: eis@odu.edu
Enterprise Information Systems
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
  
 
 
Identities and relationships in dynamic cross-enterprise collaborations  
 
299x128mm (200 x 200 DPI)  
 
 
Page 19 of 26
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/teis  Email: eis@odu.edu
Enterprise Information Systems
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
  
 
 
Trust boundaries for cross-organizational networked production in Industry  
4.0  
 
553x226mm (200 x 200 DPI)  
 
 
Page 20 of 26
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/teis  Email: eis@odu.edu
Enterprise Information Systems
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
  
 
 
Role-based access control metamodel  
 
279x97mm (200 x 200 DPI)  
 
 
Page 21 of 26
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/teis  Email: eis@odu.edu
Enterprise Information Systems
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
  
 
 
Registering devices as managed objects  
 
508x719mm (200 x 200 DPI)  
 
 
Page 22 of 26
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/teis  Email: eis@odu.edu
Enterprise Information Systems
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
  
 
 
Identity management and access control with legacy production systems  
 
301x93mm (200 x 200 DPI)  
 
 
Page 23 of 26
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/teis  Email: eis@odu.edu
Enterprise Information Systems
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
  
 
 
Attribute reconciliations in Protege  
 
 
Page 24 of 26
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/teis  Email: eis@odu.edu
Enterprise Information Systems
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
  
 
 
Systematic scalability analysis for a read-heavy workload (95% read - 5%  
write)  
 
122x72mm (200 x 200 DPI)  
 
 
Page 25 of 26
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/teis  Email: eis@odu.edu
Enterprise Information Systems
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
  
 
 
Systematic scalability analysis for a write-heavy workload (50% read - 50% write)  
 
122x72mm (200 x 200 DPI)  
 
 
Page 26 of 26
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/teis  Email: eis@odu.edu
Enterprise Information Systems
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
